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I. INTRODUCTION
The United Kingdom and Russia have undergone impressive
privatization efforts in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. By
juxtaposing the statutory information requirements found in the
privatization laws of these countries, it is possible to glean
insightful lessons regarding privatization planning.
Before the 1970s, the United Kingdom nationalized major
public utilities such as coal, railways, electricity,
telecommunications, and gas.1 During the late 1970s and the
1980s, however, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
reversed this policy. She decided that private ownership of these
utilities would improve efficiency and provide the British state
with much needed capital. The Thatcher government approached
privatization not through one set plan, but rather through
piecemeal legislation. 2 This legislation guaranteed that citizens
and potential investors had extensive and accurate information
about the newly-privatized companies. This aspect of British
privatization legislation enabled participants to invest wisely, thus
ensuring the efficiency of privatized industries and the fair price of
their stocks.
More recently, under the leadership of President Boris
Yeltsin, Russia has also enacted legislation that has, at a dizzying
speed,3 transferred thousands of enterprises from public to private
hands.4 The scope of this legislation dwarfs that of the United
Kingdom. The success of Russia's privatization legislation
continues to impress many because it has accomplished many of its
goals. It has given fewer assurances than British legislation,
however, that potential investors are provided comprehensive and
meaningful information. Privatization legislation that fails to
ensure public availability of material information about privatized
1. See Andrew Gamble, Privatization, Thatcherism, and the British State, 16 J.L.
Soc'Y 1, 1-2 (1988).
2 See Andrew J. Ritten, Comment, Perspectives on Privatization and Plant-Level
Industrial Relations: Great Britain in the 1980s, Germany in the 1990s, 12 J. INT'L L. Bus.
216,232 (1991).
3. For a discussion on the pace of Russian privatization, see Pekka Sutela, Insider
Privatisation in Russia: Speculations on Systemic Change, 46 EUROPE-ASIA STUD.
(formerly SOVIET STUD.) 417,418-20,424 (1994).
4. See Merton J. Peck, Russian Privatization: What Basis Does it Provide For a
Market Economy?, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21, 22 (1995).
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companies allows investors who have access to non-public
information to secure an unfair advantage over those who do not.5
This Comment contrasts the privatization legislation of the
United Kingdom and Russia in a limited context. It focuses on the
requirement that potential investors receive the information they
need to participate effectively and fairly in the privatization
process. To exemplify their differences in this regard, it contrasts
two acts--the British Telecommunications Act of 1984,6 and the
Russian Federation Privatization of State and Municipal
Enterprises Act of 1991 (Russian Privatization Act).
7
Before reviewing the information provisions of these two acts,
Part II of this Comment introduces the notion of privatization and
sets out its general objectives. Part III overviews the important
role information plays in privatization legislation. Part IV
explores the historical background of the British privatization
campaign and briefly discusses its goals. It then examines the
information requirements mandated by the British
Telecommunications Act, which privatized the
telecommunications industry. Part V providesa similar analysis of
the Russian privatization efforts. It reviews the Russian
nationalization efforts that began early in the twentieth century,
briefly summarizes Russia's privatization efforts, and examines the
information provision of the Russian Privatization Act. Section VI
contrasts the British and Russian approaches and comments on
their differences. Lastly, Part VII presents some concluding
remarks.
II. WHAT IS PRIVATIZATION?
Stated simply, privatization is the process of transferring state
activities and assets from the public sector to the private sector.8
The reasons for privatizing state assets do not vary dramatically.
Among the most widely espoused reasons are to create an
enterprise culture, increase competition, reduce government
involvement in industry decision-making, eliminate waste,
5. See discussion infra Part III.
6. See British Telecommunications Act, 1984, ch. 12 (Eng.).
7. See Law of the Russian Federation No. 1531-1 of July 3, 1991 on the Privatization
of State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation (GARANT 10005710),
Economic Law of Russia, reprinted in 1 BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LAWS OF RUSSIA §
2.02 (Mark C. Swords ed. Russica Info. Inc. trans., 1995).
8. See Ritten, supra note 2, at 231.
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minimize state dependency, and increase and improve the quality
of goods and services.
9
In practice, however, implementing the goals of privatization
is much more complex. No set scheme or formula for privatization
exists. Consequently, privatization plans differ widely across their
sundry geographical and temporal settings.
III. WHY IS INFORMATION IMPORTANT TO PRIVATIZATION?
Information plays a vital role in securities markets. 10 Modem
economists agree that the price of securities (such as shares of
stock) reflects a general consensus of value by the majority of
investors,11 and that their consensus fully reflects available
information. 12 As long as all investors have adequate, accurate
information, and can analyze that information reasonably well, the
price they agree upon in the market place will reflect the best
estimate of the security's true value.13 This notion is called the
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH).
ECMH is important for two reasons. First, it means that the
market uses all available information as it directs capital to those
investments that are most profitable. 14 Identifying and investing in
undervalued enterprises tends to maximize efficiency, boost
employment, and minimize waste. If investors cannot accurately
identify and invest in attractively-priced enterprises, capital will
9. See generally id. at 231-32; see also Peter Rutland, Privatization in East Europe:
Another Case of Words that Succeed and Policies that Fail?, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 9 (1995).
10. For the authoritative discussion on the importance of information on the pricing
of securities, see generally WILLIAM F. SHARPE, INVESTMENTS 79 (4th ed. 1990).
11. See generally id. at 77.
12. See generally Christopher Paul Saari, Comment, The Efficient Capital Market
Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STANFORD
L. REV. 1031 (1976-77). The hypothesis that market efficiency is dependent on
information flow is called the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH). See id; see
also BRADFORD CORNELL, CORPORATE VALUATION TOOLS FOR EFFECTIVE
APPRAISAL AND DECISION MAKING 39-42 (1993).
13. See SHARPE, supra note 10, at 77.
14. See Saari, supra note 12, at 1035. "Directing capital" here expresses a two part
trend. First, investors will sell (rather than buy) more securities of disfavored enterprises.
This drives the securities' prices down to meet the lower demand. Second, the converse is
also true-investors will purchase (rather than sell) more securities of favored enterprises.
This drives the price up to meet the increased demand. Investors, both buyers and sellers,
thus direct capital from company to company depending on their assessment of the
securities' value. Their assessment is controlled by the information those investors
receive.
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flow to endeavors in amounts disproportionate to the endeavors'
true values. If ECMH is correct, therefore, markets that do not
efficiently provide all material information necessary to making
prudent investment decisions can expect to be less efficient than
those that do provide such information.
15
Second, investors cannot accurately estimate the value of a
security unless they have all information material to their analysis.
If they cannot accurately estimate the value of a security, then they
cannot identify those securities that are undervalued or
overvalued. 16 When incomplete or inaccurate information is made
available to the public, persons such as insiders, who have access to
superior, non-public information, are able to secure an unfair
advantage because they can more accurately determine whether
the security is overvalued or undervalued in relation to their
fundamentals. If the security is overvalued, the investor is able to
sell the security for more than it is worth, and thereby realize a
profit. Conversely, if the security is undervalued, the investor can
purchase the security, wait for its price to climb to reflect its true
value, and then sell at a profit. Those who have access to non-
public information, therefore, can secure an unfair advantage over
those who do not, and can trade in securities at the expense of the
ignorant investors.
17
Investors analyze many factors in determining the value of
securities. Certainly, daily information about the activities of a
company, such as law suits filed against it or on its behalf, new
15. For a discussion on this and on the ECMH, see generally id at 1031.
16. See id. An undervalued stock is one that is priced lower than the price would be if
all material information were known. Conversely, an overvalued stock is one that is
priced higher than all material information would warrant. See id. at note 23. Economists
assume that investors value stocks based on expected returns, i.e. the average probability
of receiving forecasted returns. See id. at 1036. When combined with the ECMH theory,
this proposition postulates that in an efficient market, "all available information is used to
determine expected returns on securities, and therefore to establish security prices." Id at
1038. Market efficiency implies, therefore, that without all available information, it is
impossible to determine which stocks are overvalued or undervalued in relation to their
fundamentals. See id. at 1036.
17. Note, for example, that to prevent this kind of unfair use of information, the
United States Congress prohibits trading by certain insiders. See Securities Exchange Act
(1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); see also SEC Rule 10b-5. (A corporate insider, who because of
his position or intimate association with a corporation, has greater knowledge of financial
affairs of the corporation and because of that superior knowledge, has a duty to disclose
known facts, not available to those with whom he deals, which he should reasonably know
would be material to them in determining the value of the corporation's stock. Myzel v.
Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967).
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contracts entered into, and announcements of earnings composes
an essential element in their analysis. Daily information, however,
makes up only part of the equation.
The financial posture of a company is another key element in
the valuation process. When valuing a company and forecasting its
earnings, investors heavily rely on information about trends in
earnings over periods of five years (often regarded as short-run
analysis) and ten years (often regarded as long-run analysis).
18
For the price of a company's securities to equal its true value,
therefore, all investors must have material, accurate information
about the company, including its financial data over a number of
years.
19
If economists are correct that information plays an
indispensable role in market efficiency and the fair pricing of
securities, privatization laws that transfer national assets to private
hands by selling securities, if they are to be fair, must ensure the
public availability of all information material to making
investment decisions.
IV. PRIVATIZATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
A. Historical Context
1. Nationalization of Industries
Since the Industrial Revolution, the British State has played
18. See generally MARY BUFFETr & DAVID CLARK, BUFFETTOLOGY-THE
PREVIOUSLY UNEXPLAINED TECHNIQUES THAT HAVE MADE WARREN BUFFETr THE
WORLD'S MOST FAMOUS INVESTOR 201 (1997).
[I]nvestors and creditors can use the information on the income statement to
evaluate the past performance of the enterprise. Although success in the past
does not necessarily mean success in the future, some important trends may be
determined. It follows that if a reasonable correlation between past and future
performance can be assumed; then predictions of future cash flows can be made
with some confidence.
DONALD E. KIESO & JERRY J. WEYGANDT, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 138-39 (8th
ed. 1995) (emphasis omitted).
19. Financial data over a number of years also helps to ensure that no accounting
manipulations occur. For example, on any one income statement, a company's earnings
may be artificially increased by writing-off an untruthfully small bad-debt expense, or by
capitalizing certain expenditures instead of expensing them. Similarly, earnings or cash
flows may be artificially decreased. In the United States, Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) minimize potential dangers such as biases, misrepresentations and
ambiguities. See generally KIESO & WEYGANDT, supra note 18, at 9, 17-18.
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an active economic role by regulating wages and certain prices.
Although large-scale nationalization of industries in the United
Kingdom did not exist until the 1940s, the government began
increasing state ownership in the late nineteenth century. 20 This
nationalization sought to break the natural monopolies that
developed with the advent of new technologies, and to combat
problems of inadequate services provided by private companies in
vital industries such as water supply.
21
By 1907, the British government owned many industries,
including much of the gas and electric industries, water,
telecommunications, shipyards, and the postal service. 22 By 1918,
the Labour Party had adopted a policy to equitably distribute
income by means of state ownership of industries. 23 Nevertheless,
the overall percentage of state-run industries at that time was only
about 7.9%.24
Britain undertook much of the state ownership of industries
for strategic and defense purposes.25 For example, Prime Minister
Winston Churchill purchased British Petroleum shares on behalf
of the British Government in 1914. The government also
sponsored the amalgamation of four major airline companies in
1924 into the subsidized Imperial Airways. Later, the government
also formed and subsidized British Airways.26
From 1945 to 1951, the Labour government effected a
significant shift in the process of nationalization. 27 Two reasons
account for this. First, the Labour Party was ideologically inclined
toward state ownership of the means of production,
transportation, and distribution.28 Second, it thought that state
control of industries would allow the government to plan a
national economic recovery and postwar reconstruction. 29
20. See generally James Foreman-Peck, The Privatization of Industry in Historical
Perspective, 16 J.L. & SOC'Y 132 (1988).
21. See id. at 129, 134. For example, poor water services often caused outbreaks of
cholera and inadequate fire-fighting services. See id. at 132-33.
22. See id at 135.
23. See id at 137-38.
24. See id. at 135.
25. See id. at 136.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 129. See generally id. at 131-40.
28. See generally Ritten, supra note 2, at 229.
29. See id.
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The upshot is that the war-time experience of physical planning
tended to create an administrative hubris that carried over to
the peace time. There was a widespread belief that large units
were more efficient than small ones. Because of the monopoly
problem, the policy issue was whether the units would be
directly controlled through state ownership or whether some
form of indirect control through regulation was preferable. A
landslide majority for the Labour Party in 1945 provided
further ideological support for nationalization, buttressed by
the voting power within the Trade Union Congress of the coal,
railway, and transport unions.
30
This post-war period ushered in a new and durable policy that
redefined the relationship between the public and private
sectors. 31 At the core of this relationship was a vast increase in the
role and responsibilities of the state.32 The public sector grew
rapidly, not only by nationalizing major public industries such as
gas, coal, electricity and railways, but also by expanding its role in
collective welfare, social security, public housing programs,
economic and environmental planning, and by restructuring public
education. 3
3
For a time, the Conservatives found public programs such as
the funding of housing, health care, and education, to be a
necessary responsibility of the modern state.34 Their ideology,
however, did not last. Upon returning to control of government in
1951, the Conservatives slowly began to taper the nationalization
policy of the 1940s.35 During the 1950s, high levels of public
spending and taxation caused a growing number of people to
question the need for public ownership of the means of
production, distribution and exchange.36
30. Foreman-Peck, supra note 20, at 138.
31. See Gamble, supra note 1, at 1.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 1-2.
34. See id. at 2 For a discussion on British nationalization, see R. KELF-COHEN,
BRITISH NATIONALISATION 1945-1973 (1973).
35. See Gamble, supra note 1, at 2.
36. See id.
For many in the [Conservative] party the question of public or private ownership
has always been a question of expediency not principle. There was a ritual battle
over the steel industry, but even here its eventual inclusion in the public sector in
1967 was accepted. As long as the private sector remained vigorous and
competitive the existence of a large public sector did not trouble Conservatives.
[Vol. 20:837
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2. The Shift Toward Privatization
The British nationalization policies implemented during the
1940s slowed dramatically during the 1970s because Britain lacked
relative economic success.37 In the mid-1970s--a period of world
economic deceleration-the weakness of the British economy was
fully exposed and exacerbated by the changes in technology and
patterns of global divisions of labor.
38
When Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1979, the British
economic situation was ripe for change.39 From the beginning, the
Thatcher government blamed the lagging productivity of
nationalized industries on public ownership and state intervention
in the market.
40
The years following 1979 marked a fundamental reversal in
British nationalization policy.41 Three factors help explain this
reversal:
First, the long-term tendency was based on errors that were
only fully appreciated after 1979; secondly, privatization is a
mistaken policy that neglects the lessons of history; and thirdly,
the underlying conditions that had warranted state ownership
had changed by the beginning of the 1980s and new policies
were therefore justified. 
2
After the shock of the currency slump in the first two years of
the Thatcher government, privatization emerged as one of the
major themes of the economic recovery and of the government's
plans for the economy.43 By 1983, the government realized it had
to reform the nationalization policy to effect economic recovery. 44
In 1983, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, John Moore MP,
stated that:
37. See Gamble, supra note 1, at 2-3.
38. See id. at 3.
39. See Ritten, supra note 2, at 231. The Thatcher General Election manifesto
expressed the party's opposition to more nationalization and the intent to shift aerospace
and shipbuilding duties to the private sector. See Foreman-Peck, supra note 20, at 140.
40. See Ritten, supra note 2, at 231.
41. In 1980, however, large numbers of industries still remained state-owned. See id.
at 229.
42. Foreman-Peck, supra note 20, at 129.
43. See Gamble, supra note 1, at 9.
44. See Foreman-Peck, supra note 20, at 140.
8451998]
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Privatization is a key element of the government's economic
strategy. It will lead to a fundamental shift in the balance
between the public and private sectors. It is already bringing
about a profound change in attitudes within state industries.
And it opens up exciting possibilities for the consumer; better
pay, conditions and employment opportunities for the
employees; and new freedom for the managers of the industries
concerned.4
5
During Thatcher's first term, the British government only
privatized small companies that could effectively operate in
competitive markets.46  After 1983, however, the Thatcher
government created new regulatory rules and agencies, and
privatized very large industries such as British Gas and British
Telecommunications. 4
7
Scholars have identified several stages in the privatization
program in Britain.48 The first two stages are relevant to the
discussion here.
The first stage encompassed the period from 1979 to early
1984.49 At that time, while no formal privatization program
existed, extensive "disposals" transferred ownership of public
agencies to private parties.50 Motives were mixed, "with the short-
term effect on the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement
dominant. Most of the industries sold were in some sense
competitive, and disposals did not include the major public
utilities. '"
51
The second stage commenced with the adoption of the
program set out in the Public Expenditure White Paper, which
initially called for the privatization of £2 billion worth of state
assets each year.52 In 1985, the figure was raised to £4.75 billion in
the Chancellor's Autumn Statement. 53 The government privatized
the major public utilities during this stage. 54
45. Gamble, supra note 1, at 9 (citations omitted).
46. See Foreman-Peck, supra note 20, at 141.
47. See id.
48. See Cosmo Graham & Tony Prosser, Privatizing Nationalized Industries:
Constitutional Issues and New Legal Techniques, 50 MOD. L. REV. 16, 17 (1987).
49. See id
50. See id.
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. See id
54. See id.
[Vol. 20:837846
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In short, Margaret Thatcher's government, motivated by an
economic slump and a change in economic ideology, privatized
many companies through a series of piecemeal decisions and
acts.55 These efforts smoothly transferred ownership of numerous
industries from the public to the private sector.
B. The Objectives of British Privatization
The United Kingdom undertook its privatization campaign
for many typical reasons. One scholar identifies the following key
objectives to the British privatization efforts under Margaret
Thatcher's government:
[E]xtension of freedom of choice; efficiency and the elimination
of waste; reduction of Public Sector Borrowing Requirement;
control of public sector pay and weakening of the power of
public sector unions; the removal of many decisions from the
political process altogether; the widening of share ownership
both among citizens and employees; the promotion of
liberalization and competition; and the enlargement of active
citizenship and the contraction of state dependency. 56
Scholars John Vickers and George Yarrow present seven
aims of the privatization program, repeating several of those
identified above. The aims are: to improve efficiency in the
privatized industries; to ease problems in public sector pay
determination; to reduce government involvement in industry; to
reduce the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement; to widen share
ownership; to encourage employee share ownership; and to gain
political advantage. 57
In Britain, the privatization scheme was seen not as one strictly structured
program, but rather as a set of various initiatives. There was no comprehensive
plan for how privatization should proceed, rather it took place through a series
of ad hoc decisions and experiments. Although the Thatcher government
maintained that its privatization policy incorporated a coherent and well
thought-out program, commentators have suggested that there really have been
a variety of themes often with conflicting implications.
Ritten, supra note 2, at 232 (citations omitted).
55. See Gamble, supra note 1, at 7.
56. Id. at 11.
57. See JOHN VICKERS & GEORGE YARROW, PRIVATISATION: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 157 (1988); see also Cosmo Graham, Privatization-The United Kingdom
Experience, 21 BROOK J. INT'L L. 185, 191 (1995).
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C. The British Telecommunications Act of 1984
The process of privatizing whole enterprises in Britain is well
illustrated by the privatization of British Telecommunications.
58
British Telecommunications had traditionally been a part of the
post office. In 1981, British Telecommunications split from the
post office, pursuant to the Telecommunications Act of 1981.
59
Several years later, on April 1, 1984, a limited company with
the same British Telecommunications name was created. 60 On
April 6, 1984, in accordance with Section 60 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1984,61 the corporate business of
British Telecommunications was transferred to a limited company
with the same name.62  Pursuant to Section 61 of the
Telecommunications Act, the Secretary of State was issued all
shares.63 On November 16, 1984, the government offered 50.2%
of the shares for sale to the public.
64
Section 70 of the Telecommunications Act of 1984 requires
the government to provide information to the public in the form of
a prospectus. 65  Specifically, it requires that any form of
application for shares or debentures be issued either with a "full
prospectus" or, if certain requirements are met, with an "offer
prospectus." 66 A "full prospectus" is defined in Section 70(1) as a
"prospectus which complies, or is deemed to comply, with the
requirements of Schedule 4 to the Companies Act [of] 1948. ' '67
The Companies Act of 1948 governs corporations, including
the prospectus requirements. 68 Schedule 4 to the 1948 Companies
Act specifies numerous items that each prospectus must contain.
The Act provides detailed information to all prospective investors.
58. See Graham & Prosser, supra note 48, at 21.
59. See British Telecommunications Act, 1981, Ch. 38, art. 10 (Eng.).
60. See Graham & Prosser, supra note 48, at 21.
61. See British Telecommunications Act, § 60, supra note 6, § 60.
62. See id; see also Graham & Prosser, supra note 48, at 21.
63. British Telecommunications Act, supra note 61, § 61.
64. See Graham & Prosser, supra note 48, at 21.
65. Section 70 applies "where the Secretary of State or a nominee of his offers for sale
to the public shares or debentures of the successor company at a time when that company
is wholly owned by the Crown." Telecommunications Act, § 70(1). After the initial public
offering, section 70 presumably no longer applies, leaving the Companies Act and other
securities regulations to apply as they otherwise would.
66. Id. §§ 70(2)-(3).
67. Id. § 70(1).
6& See Companies Act, 1948 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38 (Eng.). The Companies Act was
amended in 1985, and again in 1989.
[Vol. 20:837848
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Among the more important items the government must include in
a prospectus are:
1) The number, description, and amount of any shares or
debentures of the company which any person has, 69 as well as
the names and addresses of the vendors;
70
2) The dates of, parties to and general nature of every material
contract (not entered into in the ordinary course of the
business), or contract entered into more than two years before
the date of issue of the prospectus;
71
3) A report by the company's auditors with respect to profits and
losses, assets and liabilities, and the rates of the dividends paid
by the company and in respect to each class of shares in the
company in respect to each of the five72 financial years
immediately preceding the issue of the prospectus (and if no
accounts were made for any part of the five year period, a
statement of that fact);7
3
4) If the company has no subsidiaries, the report must deal with
the profits or losses of the company in respect to each of the
five 74 financial years immediately preceding the issue of the
prospectus; and deal with the assets and liabilities of the
company at the last date to which the accounts of the company
were made;75
5) If the company has subsidiaries, the report must either set out
the company's profits and losses as a whole with the
subsidiaries' combined profits, or list each subsidiary's profits
and losses separately; and the company's assets and liabilities
must also be set out either as a whole with the combined assets
and liabilities of subsidiaries, or of each subsidiary
individually;76 and
6) If the company is to use the proceeds from the sale of shares or
debentures to purchase any business, a report must be made by
accountants (who must be named in the prospectus) as to the
69. See id. at schedule 4, § 7.
70. See id. at schedule 4, § 9(1). Studies have shown that information regarding the
vendor of stocks can affect a stock's market price. See Saari, supra note 12, at 1047.
71. See Companies Act, schedule 4, § 14.
72. See discussion supra Part III.
73. See id § 19(1).
74. See discussion supra Part III.
75. See Companies Act, § 19(2).
76. See id. § 19(3).
1998] 849
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business' profits or losses for the preceding five 77 years, and its
assets and liabilities at the last date to which the accounts of
the business were made.78
These requirements enable investors to discern the financial
soundness of the company whose shares are being offered for sale.
Furthermore, they provide information spanning a period of five
years. Such a span of information allows investors to study trends
in earnings and project future earnings. This helps investors to
value the company's securities and determine whether they are a
good investment. 79 This legislation thereby promotes fair pricing
of the securities and market efficiency.
Furthermore, Sections 43 and 44 of the Companies Act set
out stiff civil and criminal penalties, respectively, for providing
untrue statements in the prospectus.
80
Section 43, which imposes civil liability, provides that all
company's directors and everyone who has authorized the issue of
the prospectus are liable to compensate anyone who purchases
shares or debentures in reliance on untrue information in the
prospectus. 81 By creating civil liability "for the loss or damage...
sustained by reason of any untrue statement included" in the
prospectus, Section 43 substantially deters vendors from making
any untrue statements in the prospectus. 82 Furthermore, this
section allays the private investors' fears by providing them
recourse for their reliance on any untruthful information.
In addition to the civil liability, Section 44 further promotes
-the dissemination of truthful information by imposing criminal
liability, with the possibility of imprisonment, on any person who
authorizes the issuance of a prospectus containing untrue
information.83
The British Telecommunications Act of 1984 allows the
Secretary of State to distribute application forms without having to
issue each application with a full prospectus. For that exception to
77. See discussion supra Part III.
78. See Companies Act, Schedule 4, § 20.
79. See discussion supra Part III.
80. See Companies Act, §§ 43-44.
81. See Companies Act, Schedule 4, § 43.
82. See id.
83. See id. § 44. This section allows a person to avoid criminal liability if "he proves
either that the statement was immaterial or that he had a reasonable ground to believe
and did, up to the time of the issue of the prospectus, believe that the statement was true."
Id. § 44(I)(b).
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apply, the full prospectus must be published in at least four
national newspapers before shares are sold, and copies of the full
prospectus must be made "generally available in the United
Kingdom for inspection by members of the public." 84 When these
conditions are met, the Secretary of State may issue, instead of a
full prospectus, a "notice" (called an "offer prospectus") that tells
where a full prospectus can be obtained. The "notice" also briefly
describes the shares offered, the terms of the offer, and the
company's financial position.85  Presumably, this provision is
merely a paper-saving exception. It allows the Secretary of State
to issue an abbreviated notice, instead of a voluminous prospectus,
that provides the most relevant information and that tells the
prospective investor where he or she may obtain a full prospectus.
In short, the Telecommunications Act of 1984, by and
through its incorporation of the Companies Act of 1948 (and its
subsequent counterparts), provides a scheme for ensuring that
potential investors have comprehensive, truthful information
regarding the company's financial situation. Such information
promotes the underpinnings of the Efficient Capital Market
Hypothesis.
V. PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA
A. Historical Context
1. The Soviet Era of State Ownership
A variety of factors led to the nationalization of industries in
the Soviet Union.86 In the last two decades of the nineteenth
century, Russia underwent rapid and wide-scale industrialization
at a rate that outpaced even the United States.87 At the beginning
of this century, Russia's economy continued to develop. By some
84. Telecommunications Act 1984, § 70(3).
85. See id. § 70(2).
86. Although this Comment will not provide a comprehensive treatment of Soviet
nationalization, the following discussion briefly overviews the subject. For a discussion on
the fascinating nationalization efforts in Russia and the Soviet Union, See GEOFFREY
HOSKING, THE FIRST SOCIALIST SOCIETY, A HISTORY OF THE SOVIET UNION FROM
WITHIN (1990); See also NICHOLAS RIASANOVSKY, A HISTORY OF RUSSIA (4th ed.
1984).
87. See Stanley Fischer, Russia and the Soviet Union Then and Now, in 1 THE
TRANSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE 221,222 (Olivier Jean Blanchard, et al. eds., 1994).
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estimates, Russia's national income in 1913 equaled that of the
United Kingdom and slightly trailed that of Germany.
88
On November 7, 1917, the Bolsheviks took power in Russia.
89
Two days later, they organized the government of the Soviet
Union.90 While their seizure of power came rather easily, the
Bolsheviks struggled for several years to consolidate their power.
91
During their struggle to establish power, the Bolsheviks mobilized
the resources and population they controlled, and implemented a
policy of "War Communism," followed by a "New Economic
Policy," (NEP).92 Subsequently, under Joseph Stalin's leadership,
they developed the Five Year Plan (FYP), which survived into the
Gorbachev era.
a. War Communism
War Communism refers to the period of Bolshevik control,
characterized by large-scale nationalization of industry, which
lasted from June 1918, until March 1921, when the NEP began.
93
Nationalization efforts were systematized with the decree of
June 28, 1918.94 The decree ordered the "nationalization, without
recompense, of all industrial enterprises and railroads with capital
of one million rubles or more owned by corporations or
partnerships." 95 The state took over equipment and assets of the
nationalized businesses, and managers were ordered to remain at
their posts under the threat of severe penalties.
96
88. See id. at 221.
89. For a comprehensive treatment of the Great October Revolution of 1917, see
RICHARD PIPES, THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION (1990). For a somewhat more abridged
treatment, see MARTIN MCCAULEY, THE SOVIET UNION SINCE 1917 (1981).
90. The Old Style date was October 25, thus the name "the Great October
Revolution." See RIASANOVSKY, supra note 86, at 461.
91. See id. at 474.
92. See id.
93. See MCCAULEY, supra note 89, at 33.
The large-scale nationalisation of June 1918, partly in response to the fear that
vital industrial plants could fall under German control if left in private hands,
saw all important enterprises placed under the control of VSNKh (the Supreme
Council of the National Economy). Although Lenin would have preferred a
mixed economy he finally accepted what most workers wanted, a socialist
economy.
Id. at 34. For a discussion about the NEP, see discussion infra Part V.A.I.b.
94. See PIPES, supra note 89, at 692.
95. Id.
96. See id.
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While War Communism saw the build up. of a nationalized
economy, the economy stumbled. Money became worthless,
barter emerged on a large scale, and famine was rampant. 97 The
dire economic situation caused peasant and military uprisings.
98
Although the Bolsheviks won the Civil War, they lost the
economic war.99  The Bolsheviks' lack of economic success
throughout the civil war, perhaps more than any other factor,
shaped the Soviet regime.
100
b. The New Economic Policy (NEP)
In March 1921, the Bolsheviks hesitantly changed their
economic planning strategy because of the severe economic
problems of the War Communism period.1° 1 Their new policy, the
NEP, legalized private trade, and generally took steps to
ameliorate the harsh effects of the choke-hold policies of War
Communism.
102
These steps partially succeeded. Industrial and agricultural
97. See MCCAULEY, supra note 89, at 33.
Something like eight million people perished during the years 1918-1920, seven
and a half million due to hunger and disease. The working class was decimated,
the cities lost many of their inhabitants and the intelligentsia was either dead or
had emigrated. Culturally Russia was at a very low ebb.
Id. at 35.
98. See RIASANOVSKY, supra note 89, at 488. For example,
in March 1921, the Kronstadt naval base, celebrated by the Communists as one
of the sources of the October Revolution, rose in rebellion against the
Communist rule . . . . Although Red Army units ruthlessly suppressed the
uprising, the well-nigh general dissatisfaction with Bolshevik rule could not have
been more forcefully expressed. And it was against this background of utter
devastation and discontent that Lenin, who, besides, had finally to admit that a
world revolution was not imminent, proceeded in the spring of 1921 to
inaugurate his New Economic Policy in place of War Communism.
Id.
99. See MCCAULEY, supra note 89, at 33.
100. See id.
101. For a more comprehensive treatment of War Communism and the New Economic
Policy, see generally Riasanovsky, supra note 86, at 474-91.
102. See Fischer, supra note 87, at 224-25.
If War Communism was a leap into socialism then the New Economic Policy
(NEP) was a leap out of socialism. The extreme egalitarianism, the ever
expanding role of the State, the breakneck speed of the attempt to make the
economic life of the country socialist and the concomitant rejection of economic
laws gave way to the legitimisation of small-scale commodity production and the
acceptance of the market.
MCCAULEY, supra note 89, at 48.
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output increased moderately,10 3 and a class of wealthy retailers
and traders, called the Nepmen, grew under this policy.10 4 But all
along, the Bolsheviks viewed the NEP only as a temporary and
necessary economic measure, 105 tolerated as a compromise to
maintain social peace.
10 6
Throughout the NEP, the government ensured its control
over the Soviet economy by maintaining ownership of most of the
country's major banks and heavy industries. 10 7 But even the NEP
decayed. Leaders of the Communist Party criticized its provisions,
perhaps in reaction to the failure of the German revolution in
October 1923, and Lenin's death in 1924.108
Due to these domestic crises and others, the NEP gave way to
a new surge in nationalization. Five Year Plans replaced the NEP
shortly after the inauguration of Joseph Stalin in December
1927.109
c. Stalin and Beyond-The Command Economy
In 1928, the first Five Year Plan (FYP) replaced the NEP. 110
Under the FYP, the private sector declined rapidly.111 Beginning
in 1928 and throughout his rule, Stalin had heavily emphasized the
need for industrial build-up. In a February, 1931 speech, Stalin
stated "One feature of the history of old Russia was the continual
beatings she suffered because of her backwardness .... We are
fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must
catch up this distance in ten years. Either we do it or we go
under."' 1 2
While it is difficult to explain the ideological reasons behind
the FYP, it can perhaps be best explained as an attempt to bring
the Soviet economy into line with Marxist theory.113 Although
103. See Fischer, supra note 87, at 225.
104. See RIASANOVSKY, supra note 86, at 489; see also Fischer, supra note 87, at 226
n.15.
105. See RIASANOVSKY, supra note 86, at 495.
106. See DAVID SHEARER, INDUSTRY, STATE, AND SOCIETY IN STALIN'S RUSSIA
1926-1934, at 27 (1996).
107. See id. at 27-28.
108. See id. at 7.
109. See RIASANOVSKY, supra note 86, at 492-508.
110. See Fischer, supra note 87, at 226.
111. See id.
112. See HOSKING, supra note 86, at 150.
113. See RIASANOVSKY, supra note 86, at 494-95.
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Marxism never mentioned five year plans, or even large-scale
industrialization, it nevertheless presupposed high levels of
industrialization, which Russia lacked. 114  Whatever the
explanation,
[t]he First Five-Year Plan and its successors hit the Soviet
Union with tremendous impact. The U.S.S.R. became a great
industrial nation: from being the fifth country in production
when the plans began, it was eventually second only to the
United States .... A vast social transformation accompanied
the economic, while at the same time the entire Soviet system as
we have come to know it acquired its definitive form in the
difficult decade of the '30's.115
During the six-year period between 1930 and 1936, the Soviet
Union collectivized almost all of the agricultural industry, with
devastating consequences. 116 While the output of industry at this
time increased at a rapid 10% per year, millions died of famine in
1933 alone. 117
World War II then began. It devastated the Soviet Union.
The losses were so immense that they were almost incalculable:
70,000 villages, 98,000 kolkhozes, completely or partly
destroyed, 1,876 sovkhozes, 17 million head of cattle and 7
million horses driven away; 65,000 kilometers of railway track,
half of all the railway bridges in occupied territory, over half of
all urban living space there, 1.2 million houses destroyed as well
as 3.5 million rural homes. And then there was the greatest loss
of all, the twenty million dead, as well as the maimed in body
and in mind. 118
The FYP remained the economic planning device up to and
into the Gorbachev era. 119  In short, ideology and necessity
inspired Soviet nationalization. From 1917 until the end of
Gorbachev's rule, the Soviet Union industrialized and nationalized
the entire economy.
114. See id.
115. Id. at 494.
116. See Fischer, supra note 87, at 226.
117. See id.
118. MCCAULEY, supra note 89, at 138 (citations omitted).
119. See generally, JOHN L.H. KEEP, LAST OF THE EMPIRES, A HISTORY OF THE
SOVIET UNION 1945-1991, at 337-41 (1995). In 1959, the Khruschev government scrapped
the then-current Five Year Plan and replaced it with a new Seven Year Plan, which was
seen as somewhat more realistic. At the end of that Seven Year Plan, the government
reinstated the Five Year Plan. See RIASANOVSKY, supra note 86, at 546.
1998]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
2. The Early Reform Period
a. The Gorbachev Era
Although General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev introduced
the liberal policies of glasnost',120 perestroika,
121 and uskorenie,' 122
his government avoided "fundamentally disturb[ing] the crucial
role of central planning or state ownership."'
123
In early 1987, Gorbachev issued the Joint Venture Decree,
which opened the Soviet Union to foreign capital by allowing joint
ventures with foreign entities. This seemingly minor proclamation
"constituted in substance, if not intent, the first privatization
decree."' 124  In June 1987, the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union adopted "Basic Tenets for
the Radical Restructuring of the Management of the Economy" to
serve as the official blueprint for economic reform. 125 These two
pieces of Soviet legislation served as the basis for the first steps
toward privatization.
By 1988, the Soviet State began to relax the close monitoring
of enterprises.126 At first, this had the result of diverting profits
from public companies to private hands, and the development of a
"black market." In this market, factory employees and
bureaucrats took products that they manufactured and later
privately traded those products for goods produced by their
friends, neighbors and acquaintances. 127
120. The term glasnost' "first signified greater 'openness' in handling information from
official sources and more lively self-criticism. Gradually it came to imply a limited
freedom of expression in the media." KEEP, supra note 119, at 342. For a complete
discussion of glasnost', see STEVEN WHITE, GORBACHEV AND AFrER 17,76-103 (1992).
121. The term perestroika, or "reconstruction," commonly refers to the liberal
economic policies of the Gorbachev era. See MARSHAL GOLDMAN, WHAT WENT
WRONG WITH PERESTROIKA 124 (1992).
122. The term "uskorenie," or "acceleration," refers to the policy of "introducing new
technologies, such as computerization, and shifting investment into modernizing the
engineering industry." KEEP, supra note 119, at 339.
123. Richard C. Schneider, Privatization in One Country: Foreign Investment and the
Russian Privatization Dynamic, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 697, 703 (1994).
124. Id. at 715. For a discussion on foreign investment laws relating to oil and gas
industries in the pre-privatization period, see Lisa Halustick, Note, Privatization of the
Russian Oil and Gas Industries, 2 PARKER SCHOOL J.E. EUR. L. 201 (1995).
125. See Schneider, supra note 123, at 703.
126. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Privatization in Russia: First Steps, in 2
THE TRANSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE 137, 146 (Olivier Jean Blanchard, et. al. eds.,
1994).
127. See id.
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Lax laws, lenient law enforcement, and bribing of local law
enforcement officials made a growing black market possible. 128 In
mid-1989, however, the Supreme Soviet established the Abalkin
Commission. In October of that year, this commission proposed a
new approach to economic reform and introduced the idea of non-
state ownership in the context of worker control.
129
In November 1989, one of the first legislative steps toward
privatization came when the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted the
Fundamentals of the USSR and the Union Republics on
Leasehold (the Fundamentals). Under the Fundamentals, "the
work collective of a state enterprise was given the right to form an
organization of leaseholders (tenants) as a free standing legal
person for the purpose of founding a leasehold enterprise.
'" 130
For a variety of reasons, however, the Fundamentals failed.
Department and ministry officials, armed with discretion over
many of these transactions, often refused to lease state property.
131
Even when they did grant leases, the Fundamentals "placed
restrictions on the leasing of a fairly wide range of state owned
facilities and also on buyouts."'132 These problems caused great
difficulties in attaining the desired objectives of boosting economic
production by handing over state property to work collectives and
citizens. 133
Another main turning point in the process toward
privatization came with the "500-day plan," which economist
Stanislav Shatalin and others created and presented to the USSR
Supreme Soviet in late 1990.134 The proposal identified "universal
An enterprise manager sets up a parallel private firm or cooperative next to the
state firm or even inside it. That private firm then buys the output of the state
firm at the official controlled price and resells it at the market price. The profits
are in part kept by the managers, who of course are the owners of the private
firm, and in part distributed as higher wages to the workers.
Id.
128. See id. "Informal reports indicate that most state enterprises that produced
desirable output have engaged in at least some form of such profit diversion. Gains for all
parties at the expense of the central government made spontaneous privatization very
popular in Russia." Id.
129. See Schneider, supra note 123, at 705.
130. Andrei A. Voitko, COMMENTARY: Privatization of State and Municipal
Enterprises, in 1 BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LAWS OF RUSSIA 2-36 (Mark C. Swords
ed. & Russica Information, Inc. trans., 1995).
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. See Schneider, supra note 123, at 707.
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state ownership" ["vseobshchenost' gossobstvennosti"] as one of
the main factors responsible for the failure of the Soviet
economy.135 Under the plan, the process of instituting the reforms
were to be known as the "destatization" stage, the completion of
which would lead to a full-scale privatization program. 13
6
In September of 1990, the Supreme Soviet gave President
Gorbachev the power to regulate the economy by decree until
March 31, 1992.137 Pursuant to this authority, Gorbachev
proposed a reform plan that carried over many of the ideas
contained in the 500-day plan. This plan, however, lacked specifics
and failed to set forth a detailed timetable for the privatization of
state properties. 138 As a result, this plan was viewed as largely
unsuccessful.
At the same time, the wall separating East and West Berlin
fell, symbolizing the open failure of Communism. A stark
demonstration of discontent with Gorbachev's leadership
culminated in an attempted coup in August 1991.139 On October
28, 1991, after months of uncertainty in the wake of the failed coup
attempt, President Gorbachev declared that disorganization and a
"paralysis of power" were leading the Soviet Union towards
financial collapse. 14° On December 25, the Soviet Union was
dissolved, ending Gorbachev's rule.
Although the Soviet economy was partially liberalized during
Gorbachev's rule, privatization was never seriously considered.
Indeed, many Russians condemn Mikhail Gorbachev for not doing
more to create a free market economy and privatize industries.
3. The Yeltsin Approach to Privatization
On July 3, 1991, the Russian Federation parliament enacted
the Russian Federation Privatization of State and Municipal
Enterprises Act (Privatization Act). 141 The Act sought to "lay
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 708.
138. See id.
139. See WHITE, supra note 120, at 23.
140. See Anthony V. Raftopol, Russian Roulette: A Theoretical Analysis of Voucher
Privatization in Russia, 11 B.U. INT'L L.J. 435, 440 (1996).
141. See Law of the Russian Federation No. 1531-1 of July 3, 1991 on the Privatization
of State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation (GARANT 10005710),
Economic Law of Russia, reprinted in 1 BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LAWS OF RUSSIA §
2.02 (Mark C. Swords ed. & Russica Information Inc. trans., 1995). This Act is the main
[Vol. 20:837
The Key to Fair Privatization
down the legal and organizational principles for transforming
property relations in producer goods in the RF (Russian
Federation) through privatization of state and municipal
enterprises with the aim of creating an efficient and socially
oriented market economy."' 142 The attempted coup in August and
the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, however, delayed the
Act's implementation. 143
The official breakup of the Soviet Union came on December
25, 1991. That day also marked the so-called "war of legislation"
by the Russian Federation, which began to introduce full-scale
privatization legislation 144  to supplement and extend the
Privatization Act.
On December 30, 1991, then-Deputy Prime Minister Yegor
Gaidar revealed Russia's 1992 plan for privatization. The plan
aimed to privatize in two stages. During the first six months,
efforts were devoted to privatizing various industries such as retail
and wholesale trade, certain state agricultural enterprises and
equipment repair sites, and various food services. During the
second six months privatization efforts focused on, among other
things, small light industry, construction, and road repair
facilities. 145
On January 2, 1992, the Russian government liberalized
prices, exacerbating the already severe market shortages. 146 On
January 29, 1992, President Boris Yeltsin issued President's Edict
No. 66, which set out the basic structure of privatization in seven
appendices. 147
In July of 1992, the Russian government undertook its mass
privatization program.148 Without any evidence of thorough
focus of this Comment.
142. Id.
143. See Peter Rutland, Privatization in Russia: One Step Forward: Two Steps Back?,
46 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 1109, 1110 (1994).
144. See Kent F. Moors, The Failure of Russian Privatization 1992-1994: How the
Industrial Nomenklatura Prevented Genuine Reform, 3 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (1997).
145. See Moors, supra note 144, at 8.
146. See id. at 9. To give the reader an example of the severity of the market
shortages, it is worthy of mention that when the author of this Comment visited
Khmel'nitsky, Ukraine, in the Summer of 1990, he witnessed a large shopping mall, which
had previously been in full operation, completely closed and devoid of all goods and
services.
147. See RF President's Edict No. 66, Jan. 29, 1992, annexes 1-7; see also Moors, supra
note 144, at 9.
148. See Moors, supra note 144, at 24.
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planning, the government ordered that 25,000 firms be converted
into joint-stock companies. In November, 1992, it issued 148
million vouchers, each simplistically and curiously with a nominal
value of 10,000 rubles.
149
The Russian privatization process can be broken down into
the following stages: 1) the creation of joint-stock companies; 2)
the distribution of privatization vouchers; 3) the establishment,
regulation, and coordination of state-run auction houses for the
trade of enterprise shares for vouchers; and 4) the creation of
financial middlemen, information systems, and voucher investment
funds.150 The first two stages serve best to contrast the British
privatization experience with that of Russia.
a. Creating Joint-stock Companies
In privatizing, Russian companies had discretion to select one
of three plans.151 Each company would vote on its plan at a
general meeting of the work collective, each employee having one
vote.15
2
Under the first option, a company could provide its workers
with twenty-five percent of the non-voting shares, and the
management with five percent of the voting shares at a nominal
price. 153
The second option allowed managers and workers to use cash
or vouchers to acquire fifty-one percent of the voting shares at 1.7
times the July, 1992 book value.154 A majority of companies,
contrary to the expectation of the government, chose this option
over the others. 15
5
The third option allowed managers to purchase forty percent
of the company's voting shares if they gave assurances that the
company would continue its operations. 1
56
149. See Edict Enacting RF System of Privatization Vouchers; Statue of Privatization
Vouchers (RF President's Edict No. 914, Aug. 14, 1992), reprinted in 1 BUSINESS AND
COMMERCIAL LAWS OF RUSSIA § 2.36 (Mark C. Swords ed. & Russica Information Inc.
trans., 1995).
150. See Raftopol, supra note 140, at 454.
151. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., Order from Disorder: The Development of the Russian
Securities Markets, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 509, 514 (1995).
152. See Moors, supra note 144, at 26.
153. See Brown, supra note 151, at 514-15. See also Sutela, supra note 3, at 420.
154. See Brown, supra note 151, at 515.
155. For an explanation of the reasons for this, see Sutela, supra note 3, at 420.
156. See Brown, supra note 151, at 515.
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b. Vouchers
157
The privatization voucher program was introduced on August
14, 1992, through the issuance of Edict No. 914.158 The voucher
program constituted a critical component of the privatization
effort in Russia. In Britain, privatizing industries was achieved
simply by putting the target companies' shares up for sale on the
open-market. This method is just, assuming that each citizen has
relatively equal access to wealth, fair access to the purchasing of
shares, and full and truthful access to information about the
privatized companies.
Russia, however, faced a different situation. Rather than
privatizing a relatively small percentage of companies, Russia
underwent massive privatization at a very rapid pace. 159
Furthermore, the common Russian citizen did not have enough
capital to invest in companies had they simply been sold. 160 If
privatization in Russia was to have any semblance of fairness, a
system would have to be devised whereby the entire country's
holdings (or those that were to be privatized) would be divided up
into equal shares and distributed equally. The solution settled
upon was the voucher system.
157. For a good overview of voucher legislation, see Aleksandr Postnikov,
Commentary, Privatization Vouchers, in 1 BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LAWS OF RUSSIA
§ 2.42 (Mark C. Swords ed. & Russica Information Inc. trans., 1995). For a discussion on
the political reasons for voucher privatization in Russia (as opposed to privatization by
sales, such as in Great Britain), see Maxim Boycko et al., Voucher privatization, 35 J. FIN.
ECON. 249 (1994).
158. See Edict Enacting RF System of Privatization Vouchers; Statute of Privatization
Vouchers, RF President's Edict No. 914, reprinted in 1 BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL
LAWS OF RUSSIA § 2.36 (Mark C. Swords ed. & Russica Information Inc. trans., 1995); see
also Moors, supra note 144, at 30.
159. For example, by the end of the voucher phase of privatization in June 1994, about
70% of government enterprises had been transferred to private ownership. See Brown,
supra note 151, at 514.
160. See Boycko et al., supra note 157, at 254. A low level of wealth among common
citizens does not by itself pose a significant problem for privatizing through sales, because
if everyone were equally poor, the price of securities would simply be very low. More
importantly, however, in Russia there is a dramatically uneven distribution of wealth.
During the voucher privatization stage in Russia, there existed a sizable class of black
market businessmen and ex-communist officials who were extremely wealthy. See id.
Privatizing by sales in the face of such an unbalanced distribution of wealth would give the
wealthy class an extremely unfair advantage. The appeal of voucher privatization, then, is
to allow a much broader segment of the population to participate in the privatization
process. See id.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
Each Russian citizen stood to receive one privatization
voucher With a face value of 10,000 rubles. With this voucher he
could theoretically do one of three things: 1) trade it for shares of
joint-stock companies; 2) trade it privately with other individuals;
or 3) use it to purchase stocks in investment funds. 161 In practice,
however, each of these three options had severe limitations. This
Comment focuses primarily on one limitation of the first option,
i.e. the lack of information provided to investors, precluding them
from investing intelligently directly in the privatized companies.
B. Objectives of Russian Privatization
The Law of the Russian Federation of July 3, 1991,
Privatization of State-owned and Municipal Enterprises Act 162
("Privatization Act") sets out a rather lengthy definition of
privatization:
Privatization of state and municipal enterprises [means] the
purchase by citizens and joint-stock companies (partnerships)
from the state and local Soviets of People's Deputies into the
private ownership of enterprises, shops production sectors and
other divisions of these enterprises set up as independent
enterprises; equipment, buildings, structures, licenses, patents,
and other tangible and intangible assets of enterprises in
operation and those wound up by decision of agencies duly
authorized to take such decisions on behalf of the owner;
holdings (stakes, shares) of the state and local Soviets of
People's Deputies in the capital of joint-stock companies
(partnerships); holdings (stakes, shares) owned by enterprises
up for privatization in the capital of other joint-stock companies
(partnerships), and also of joint ventures, commercial banks,
associations, concerns, unions and other associations of
enterprises. 163
The State Program of Privatization of State-Owned and
Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation sets out the main
objectives of Russian privatization. It identifies these goals as:
161. See Raftopol, supra note 140, at 455.
162. See Law of the Russian Federation No. 1531-1 of July 3, 1991 on the Privatization
of State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation (GARANT 10005710),
Economic Law of Russia, reprinted in 1 BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LAWS OF RUSSIA §
2.02 (Mark C. Swords ed. & Russica Information Inc. trans., 1995); see also Georgi G.
Angelov, Legal Framework of Privatization in Russia, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 207,
210 (1993).
163. Id.
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1) the formation of a broad stratum of private owners as the
economic basis of market relations;
2) the attraction of broadest possible spectrum of the population to
the privatization process by means of the sale of denationalized
state-owned and municipal property for privatization cheques
(vouchers) via special cheque (voucher) auctions held prior to
July 1, 1994, and for money at auctions held after July 1, 1994;
3) the completion of privatization with privatization cheques
(vouchers), completion of privatization of objects of "small-scale
privatization" and the accelerated development of trade in the
consumer services sphere;
4) the completion of the privatization of most large and medium-
scale enterprises in industry and construction, enhancing the
efficiency of enterprises and the national economy as a whole on
the basis of restructuring the economy, expansion of post-
privatization support to enterprises, creation of a competitive
environment, and the development of a securities market;
5) the attraction of investment, including foreign investment, in
production; and
6) the promotion of measures aimed at providing the population
with social protection, including the protection of stockholders'
rights.1
64
The reforms, according to the Program, will "deregulate the
economy, stabilize the financial and monetary system, privatize
state-owned property, develop entrepreneurship, make structural
adjustments to and demilitarize the economy, and create a
competitive market environment and an active social policy. ' ' 165
The British campaign for privatization largely reflected a
conservative political movement. Privatization in Russia,
however, comes not only amid vast political change, but also amid
an onslaught of truly revolutionary transformations of the
government, society, culture, and economy. Privatization in
Russia is one aspect of a broader reform strategy which stresses
four points: "macroeconomic stabilization (stabilization of the
164. See The State Program of Privatization of State-owned and Municipal Enterprises
in the Russian Federation (Approved by Decree of the President of the Russian
Federation No. 2284 of December 24, 1993) (GARANT 10001975), Economic Law of
Russia, March 14, 1996.
165. Angelov, supra note 162, at 208.
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ruble); the freeing of prices and economic activity in general by
ending central planning; comprehensive privatization; and the
continued provision of essentials to the impoverished (a social
safety net).' '1
66
C. The Pitfall-Article 18 of the Privatization Act
The Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises Act of
July 3, 1991 (Privatization Act), according to its own terms, "lay[s]
down the legal and organizational principles for transforming
property relations in producer goods in the RF [Russian
Federation] through privatization of state and municipal
enterprises with the aim of creating an efficient and socially
oriented economy."'167 The Act contains a total of thirty-one
articles, arranged in three chapters: general provisions (arts. 1-12);
procedure and modes of privatization of state and municipal
enterprises (arts. 13-26); and concluding provisions (arts. 27-31).
The Privatization Act is one of the core acts of the Russian
privatization legislation.168
Article 18 of the Privatization Act sets out the statutory
requirement for providing information regarding the companies
being privatized. 169 Only minimal information must be provided.
Clause one of Article 18 mandates that information on the
privatized state and municipal enterprises, and on the results of
that privatization, be "published in special bulletins of properties
funds" 170 at least one month before competitive bidding or
auction, or offer of shares for public sale.171
In privatizing municipal enterprises, the information may be
published in the unrealistically short period of two weeks prior to
166. Schneider, supra note 123, at 701-02.
167. Law of the Russian Federation No. 1531-1 of July 3, 1991 on the Privatization of
State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation (GARANT 10005710),
Economic Law of Russia, art. 27, reprinted in 1 BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LAWS OF
RUSSIA § 2.02 (Mark C. Swords ed. & Russica Information Inc. trans., 1995).
168. See Voitko, supra note 130, at 2-38.
169. See Law of the Russian Federation No. 1531-1 of July 3,1991 on the Privatization
of State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation (GARANT 10005710),
Economic Law of Russia, art. 18, cl. 1, reprinted in 1 BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LAWS
OF RUSSIA § 2.02 (Mark C. Swords ed. & Russica Information Inc. trans., 1995).
170. For enterprises with authorized capital in excess of 50 million rubles, information
must be published in the Bulletin of the Russian Federal Properties Fund. See id.
171. See id.
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the sale.172 Furthermore, unlike the British Telecommunications
Act, which mandates either the issuance of a full prospectus with
every form of application or an offer prospectus, which tells the
public where they can find a full prospectus, Article 18 makes no
mention of where citizens may find the "special bulletins."
Where the British Privatization Act provides generally for 5
years of financial data, Article 18, clause two of the Privatization
Act only requires the publication of a balance sheet for the one
year preceding privatization. 173 That Clause only mandates the
publication of:
* the area of the land parcel and description of the structures
located on it and the terms of their lease or sale;
• holdings (stakes, shares) in the capital of other enterprises
owned by the enterprise (if any);
" intangible assets (patents, trademarks, and others);
* the obligations of the enterprise (commercial, budgetary,
credit);
* the enterprise balance sheet for the past year;
" overall product mix; [and]
" average listed number of employees.174
In addition to the above requirements, Article 27 requires
that, "irrespective of the mode of privatization, a contract shall be
concluded between the vendor and purchaser of a state or
municipal enterprise. ' 175  That article also requires that the
contract recite:
information about the vendor, the purchaser, and the broker;
the name of the enterprise and its location; the structure and
price of enterprise assets, including the price of the land parcel
(in the event of its sale) or the terms of its lease; the number
and price of shares in joint-stock company (holding in
partnership); procedure for transfer of the enterprise, form and
172. See id
173. See discussion, supra note 19.
174. Law of the Russian Federation No. 1531-1 of July 3, 1991 on the Privatization of
State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation (GARANT 10005710),
Economic Law of Russia, art. 18, cl. 2, reprinted in 1 BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LAWS
OF RUSSIA § 2.02 (Mark C. Swords ed. & Russica Information Inc. trans., 1995).
175. Id. art. 27.
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dates of payment, and mutual obligations of parties in further
use of enterprise, terms on which the given enterprise was sold
by bidding; and other conditions laid down by mutual
agreement between the parties.
176
Article 28 specifies the duties of the vendor and purchaser as
follows:
The vendor . . . shall have the duty to publish notice of its
privatization, to produce for the purchaser on demand the
assets of the enterprise and the statements on its business and
financial condition, complete the transaction formalities, convey
the enterprise (assets, stakes, shares) to the purchaser, and
perform other obligations in conformity with the contract
between the vendor and the purchaser.
177
In short, the Privatization Act merely requires that minimal
financial data, such as a balance sheet for the past year, be
published in so-called "special bulletins of properties funds" within
two to four weeks of being put up for sale. Such limited
information, if the public receives it at all, provides no more than a
snap shot of the balance sheet of the privatized entity. The Act
even fails to require that the privatized enterprises' profits and
losses be disclosed. Such a paucity of information prevents an
investor from gathering the necessary information to find trends in
earnings, undermining his ability to determine whether the
company's securities are a good investment.
178
Not only are the Privatization Act's information requirements
weak, but the penalties for non-compliance with the Act are
comparatively weaker than the British Telecommunications Act.
Specifically, Article 29 of the Russian Privatization Act-the
enforcement article-provides that the state will "guarantee
respect for the rights of vendors, purchasers, their agents and
brokers."'179 It further provides that where the privatization
legislation has been breached, various entities, including
purchasers, can "file lawsuits (take action) for rescission of
transactions, elimination of breaches, and institution of
176. Id. art. 27 (2).
177. Id. art. 28 (1).
178. See discussion supra Part III.
179. See Law of the Russian Federation No. 1531-1 of July 3, 1991 on the Privatization
of State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation (GARANT 10005710),
Economic Law of Russia, art. 29, reprinted in 1 BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LAWS OF
RUSSIA § 2.02 (Mark C. Swords ed. & Russica Information Inc. trans., 1995).
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proceedings against the person at fault. ' 180 Article 30 provides
that privatization actions shall be deemed invalid where, among
other things, the bidding or auction rules are "grossly violated.
18 1
In contrast to British legislation, the Russian provisions lack an
intent element and fail to describe actions that amount to "grossly
violated."
Article 31, clause one, provides for administrative liability for,
among other things, the failure to provide information as follows:
nonpublication of privatization notice, concealment of
information about an enterprise up for privatization from
purchasers or brokers, misleading the purchaser or broker
concerning assets structure or price of the enterprise up for sale
concealment of information concerning the fact of enterprise
sale, and of outcome of competitive bidding or auction-a fine
in the amount of 10 to 30 times the statutory minimum monthly
wage. The information listed in the present Clause shall be
published at the expense of the person at fault.182
Taken together, these provisions do not explicitly mention the
possibility of imprisonment for violation, nor do they explicitly
provide for full compensation for losses resulting from the
publication of false information.
In the years following 1991, the State Committee for the
Management of State Properties ("Goskomimushchestvo")
drafted, and the Yeltsin government enacted, a whole series of
legislation that supplemented and implemented the Privatization
Act. The supplementary legislation generally does not appear
much better than the Privatization Act in terms of information
requirements. For example, the Provisional Statute on
Privatization by Auction of State and Municipal Enterprises in the
RF, enacted January 29, 1992, requires that vendors of enterprises
for sale publish in the "local press" and in "special information
bulletins" only basic information. 183  While it requires the
180. Id.
181. Id. art. 30.
182. Id. art. 31, cl. 1.
183. That statute requires the publication of:
1) the area of land parcel and a description of structures located thereon; 2) the
volume and basic mix of products, goods and services, the market share, and the
size and structure of the work force; 3) a list and a valuation of fixed assets by
groups, including nonproducer facilities; 4) started investment projects, their
estimated cost, and outlays to date; 5) state of money assets; 6) stocks and
inventories; 7) enterprise owned securities, holdings and stakes in the authorized
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publication of little more significant information than does the
Privatization Act, it at least mandates that profit and loss accounts
be divulged.
Another example of subsequent legislation is the Decision of
the Government of the Russian Federation No. 547, passed in
August 1992.184 That Decision sets out the procedure for
registering shares of public companies (joint-stock companies).
The decision provides that joint-stock companies publish
"information about the issue of shares, in the mass media,"185 and
provides for the "open sale of shares."'186 Article 7 of the Decision
requires information similar to the Privatization Act. Like its
predecessor, it neglects to define key terms such as "mass media,"
and requires only rudimentary information. 187 Article 9.5 requires
capital of other enterprises, and intangible assets (patents, trademarks and
others); 8) enterprise obligations (commercial, budgetary, credit); 9) annual
balance sheet and profit-and-loss accounts for the previous year [note, in
contrast to the British requirement of five years of financial data, this
requirement overlooks the investor's need for long-term stability analysis]; 10)
the form of the auction sale; 11) the initial selling price; 12) a procedure for the
preliminary inspection of the objects by auction participants; 13) a closing date
for acceptance of applications and other documents for participation in the
auction; 14) the date, time and venue of the auction sale; and 15) the vendor's
telephone number.
Provisional Statute on Privatization by Auction of State and Municipal Enterprises in the
RF, to RF President's Edict No. 66, annex no. 4 (Jan. 29, 1992), reprinted in 1 BUSINESS
AND COMMERCIAL LAWS OF RUSSIA § 2.08 (Mark C. Swords ed. & Russica Information
Inc. trans., 1995).
184. See Garant 4321, Decision of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 547
of Aug. 4, 1992 on Measures of Realizing the Decree of the President of the Russian
Federation No. 721 of July 1, 1992 on the Organizational Measures for Converting State-
owned Enterprises and Voluntary Associations of State-owned Enterprises into Joint-
stock Companies (amended July 12, 1993), Regulations for the Order for Registering
Shares of Public Companies Set Up During Privatization, art. 2, § 3.
185. See Decision No. 547 of August 4, 1992 on Measures of Realizing the Decree of
the President of the Russian Federation No. 721 of July 1, 1992 on the Organizational
Measures for Converting State-owned Enterprises and Voluntary Associations of State-
owned Enterprises into Joint-stock Companies (amended July 12, 1993), art. 2, § 3.
186. Id. art. 2, § 5.
187. Id. art. 7. Specifically, Article 7 requires the publication of:
1) the full name and legal address of the joint-stock company; 2) the size of the
authorized capital (the total volume of the issue of shares at their nominal
value); 3) the nominal price of one share; 4) the amount of balance profit for
1991, and for the last date of account; 5) the number and nominal value of shares
allocated to the labour organization members, and to persons entitled to receive
benefits in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation on
privatization; 6) the number and nominal value of shares offered for open sale;
7) the time-limit for the beginning of open sale; and 8) the address and location,
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that shares be "sold openly upon publication of the information
about the issue of shares in the mass media."
188
VI. COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Observations & Analysis of British Privatization Laws
The British Telecommunications Act of 1984 provides ample
information to potential investors. As a result of the requirement
that either a full prospectus or offer prospectus be issued in selling
securities, investors receive full, reliable disclosure of the
company's financial records. Particularly, investors may analyze
the company's financial data for each of the five years preceding
the privatization sale. Such information is critical to potential
investors because in its absence, they cannot discern trends in
earnings, and thereby, properly value securities offered for sale. 189
In addition to setting out the requirements, the Companies
Act provides stiff criminal and civil penalties. This aspect of the
British privatization legislation ensures that the vendor of
securities adheres to the information requirements.
B. Observations & Analysis of Russian Privatization Laws
Although the Russian privatization efforts have been largely
successful in transferring numerous industries from public to
private hands, many pitfalls compromised Russian privatization
legislation. The shallow information requirements of its
privatization laws and the massive scope of its privatization efforts
hinder Russia's success in transforming into an efficient market
economy. Perhaps most problematically, Russia's Privatization
Act merely provides investors with a snap shot of financial
information, preventing them from making fully informed
investment decisions.
Insufficient enforcement agencies and poorly-defined
standards requiring dissemination of information caused a
the telephone number of the organization in which buyers may get acquainted
with the prospectus issue (privatization plan), to learn about the time and place
of sale, and the telephone number of the seller.
Id
188. Id art. 9.
189. See generally BUFFETr & CLARK, supra note 18.
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majority of individuals,190 in practice, to either place their
vouchers in private investment funds191 or to trade their vouchers
privately. 192  The frustrations and difficulties caused by the
Russian voucher legislation prompted many Russians to sell their
vouchers to entrepreneurs and wealthy capitalists. In return, the
former voucher holders received a mere bottle of vodka or other
foodstuffs at a time when the face nominal value of the vouchers
was 10,000 rubles. 193 Furthermore, even if there had been greater
efforts to disseminate accurate material information, the sheer
scale and pace of privatization would have made enforcement very
difficult, if not impossible.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the context of securities investment, an investor needs full,
accurate, and reliable information about the companies being sold.
The Russian public never had such information during the massive
privatization that occurred in Russia throughout this decade.
Some scholars have gone so far as to suggest that:
[i]f [Russian] privatization was seen as an attempt to break the
traditional hold on industrial power, it failed. Ultimately,
capitalization will provide sufficient investment and working
capital for some, leaving others to either fend for themselves or
declare insolvency. But we shall not see the real transfer of
board room power from the old guard to the new capitalists for
190. As some commentators have noted, in practice, the common Russian citizen had
little ability to personally bid on and invest directly in private companies. "Despite a
series of presidential edicts to guarantee public awareness, require advance announcement
of auctions and tenders, and provide equal access, the real alternatives to investment funds
were nonexistent." Moors, supra note 144, at 33.
191. Private investment funds, or mutual funds, present a separate problem. Most
private funds became classic "Ponzi" schemes that paid large dividends to early investors
with money collected from later investors. Such "pyramiding" was possible because of the
astronomical inflation rate (which was doubling every month throughout the voucher
period) and because "the market for additional subscribers was wide open .... Only the
investment funds could provide [an] avenue [for investment which could keep apace with
inflation]." Moors, supra note 144, at 32. A classic and prominent example of such
pyramiding schemes in Russia is the failed "MMM" stock fund, which collapsed in July
1994. In television ads, MMM promised annual returns of 7500% after a year, and as
many as ten million people invested and lost their money in MMM. See Russian Investors
Learn Tough Lesson, USA TODAY, Aug. 1, 1994, at 5B.
192. See id.
193. For this assertion, the author relies on his conversations with various Russian
citizens who participated in the voucher program.
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perhaps a generation.
194
In contrast, the British Telecommunications Act of 1984
requires full disclosure of financial records over the five years
preceding the privatization. Furthermore, the enforcement
provisions of this Act strongly discourage circumvention of the
information requirements. Together, these provisions promote the
fair pricing of securities and equal access to the privatization
process.
Privatization laws and regulations must be written to ensure
full, accurate and reliable information. They must also ensure the
enforcement of these requirements. To provide an adequate
enforcement infrastructure, lawmakers must consider the rate and
scope of privatization. Rapid privatization and massive sell-offs,
such as those implemented during the Russian privatization
efforts, impose large risks and perhaps will inevitably encounter
many problems.
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